
















I wish I could say that I would not have done this. 
- Foreign visitor 
 
We did it because it was the Law. The authorities told us we had to do it. 
- Perpetrator 
 
It was because people believed they [the Tutsi] were the enemy. It was war. 
- Bystander 
 





The words of the foreign visitor reproduced above appear in the guest-book of a former 
church belonging to the rural community of Nyamata, located in the small central African state of 
Rwanda. In April 1994, some five thousand people sought refuge here for the same reason. They 
were members of Rwanda’s Tutsi ethnic minority. Over three days, April 14th, 15th and 16th 1994, 
the men, women, and children crammed inside of the building’s brick walls were killed without 
distinction. Their killers comprised many of their neighbours as well as a smaller number of militia-
men and soldiers alongside whom they worked. Overwhelmingly, the assailants were drawn from 
Rwanda’s Hutu ethnic majority. Their objective was clear: to kill them all.  
The visitor, however, did not give in to the impulse to revile and distance himself from the 
killers. He asks a deeper, perplexing question. Would he have acted differently if faced with the 
same circumstances with which many Rwandans were in 1994? It is with these circumstances that 
this book is concerned. How and why did they arise and culminate in such extraordinary violence 
in Rwanda, and how and why did they motivate many – but not all – ordinary Rwandans to 
participate in this violence? The contrasting statements of the three Rwandans whose words follow 
those of the foreigner above offer some insight into the difficulty of answering these two 
questions. Rwandans themselves disagree – often depending on their role in the violence. 
Although I heard many reasons and motivations, I present these three perspectives because I 
encountered them often whilst in Rwanda. They also reflect the three ideas central to the 
explanation of the violence that emerged from my research. Authority, security, and opportunity 
are each, I will show, a part of the answer to these two questions. 
At only forty-five minutes by car from the capital Kigali, Nyamata is one of the more 
commonly-visited massacre sites in Rwanda. Yet the events that took place there were replicated 
in many locales across the country in 1994. In churches, schools, government buildings, hilltops, 
and even hospitals, Tutsi gathered and were killed. For others who hid or fled alone, they often 
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met their end in much lonelier places: in swamps, amid planted fields, in their own homes, or at 
the side of a road. Their stories may never be known. Together, however, these many hundreds 
of thousands of individual dramas would come to shock the world, etching themselves indelibly 
into global public consciousness as it became clear they were part of an organized attempt to 
eliminate an entire ethnic group. By my estimate, the killing - recognized belatedly as genocide - 
would claim the lives of between 491,000 and 522,000 Tutsi – as well as thousands of Hutu.1 
Rwanda became the high water-mark for violence in Africa, and also for international indifference 
toward it.  
The failure to prevent and stop the killing would change the world in several important 
ways. The genocide would help inspire the articulation of an international ‘Responsibility to 
Protect’ and lend impetus to the movement to establish an International Criminal Court.2 It drew 
attention to the scourge of sexual violence in war when it was recognized rape could qualify as an 
act of genocide.3 And it continues to serve as an ominous reminder of inaction, having been 
invoked in an effort to mobilize international attention in the Sudan, Ivory Coast, Central African 
Republic, Kenya, and other African contexts where violence had been framed in ethnic or religious 
terms. Rwanda’s genocide was a world-historical event whose lessons continue to resonate and 
whose origins deserve to be explained.  
 
A Synopsis of the Genocide 
 
Mindful of the distortionary role emotions and politics often play in accounts of violent 
conflict, I begin by presenting a summary of the background and events leading up to the genocide 
using facts around which contestation is minimal. In 1994 and still today, Rwanda comprised a 
large Hutu majority, a Tutsi minority, and an even smaller minority of Twa.4 A Tutsi monarchy 
had governed the area as a kingdom for at least two centuries before European colonization. Both 
Germany from 1897, and then Belgium from 1916 permitted the native king, the Mwami, to remain 
                                               
1 See chapter seven for how I calculate the estimate of Tutsi killed. The number of Hutu killed after the genocide, 
mainly in the DRC, is likely to be much higher – in the tens of thousands - but the evidence on which to base an 
estimate is limited.  
2 The International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty referred to Rwanda’s genocide twenty-four 
times in its 2001 report first articulating the ‘responsibility to protect’. It also reproduced Kofi Annan’s words as UN 
Secretary-General: ‘If humanitarian intervention is, indeed, an unacceptable assault on sovereignty, how should we 
respond to a Rwanda, to a Srebrenica - to gross and systematic violations of human rights that offend every precept 
of our common humanity?’. 
3 In Prosecutor vs. Jean-Paul Akayesu (1998), the Tribunal found that rape and sexual violence ‘…constitute 
genocide in the same way as any other act as long as they were committed with the specific intent to destroy, in 
whole or in part, a particular group, targeted as such.’ See ICTR-96-4-T, paragraph 731. 
4 The exact demographic balance before the genocide is contested but most estimates for Hutu range between 85 
percent and 91 percent, Tutsi 8 percent and 14 percent, and Twa almost always 1 percent or less. 
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in place but ruled indirectly through him. The Belgians saw the Tutsi as racially superior, privileged 
them, and reified the differences between them and Hutu. They also propagated the idea the Tutsi 
originated outside of Rwanda. Then, shortly before Rwanda’s independence in 1962, a ‘Hutu 
revolution’ overthrew the monarchy. The revolutionaries, led by Grégoire Kayibanda, proclaimed 
Rwanda’s first Republic, dominated by a new Hutu elite from the south of the country. This 
historic event also triggered the exodus of tens of thousands of Tutsi civilians. Despite several 
armed attempts over the next few years, the exiles failed to return, and the attacks provoked 
retaliatory violence against the Tutsi population that had remained within Rwanda. This minority 
would live under an authoritarian and highly exclusionary regime. Then in 1973, in a coup d’état, 
a small group of northern Hutu wrested power from Kayibanda. A young Juvénal Habyarimana 
became President of Rwanda’s Second Republic. He ruled autocratically until October 1990 when 
the RPF, composed primarily of the descendants of the Tutsi exiles from the revolution, invaded 
from across the Ugandan border to the north. This began Rwanda’s civil war. At the same time, 
Habyarimana faced both internal and international pressure to democratize. In August 1993, he 
finally accepted an internationally-brokered power-sharing deal with the RPF and the main, newly-
established domestic opposition parties. A UN peacekeeping mission, UNAMIR, was fielded to 
monitor the agreement. However, there was intense opposition to the peace agreement from 
hardliners at home, and Rwandan politics grew increasingly tense.  
Eight days before the events in Nyamata’s church climaxed, on April 6th 1994 a plane 
coming in to land at Rwanda’s main airport was shot down killing all aboard. The most important 
victim was Rwanda’s Hutu President, Juvénal Habyarimana. Almost immediately, a small group of 
extremists manoeuvred to seize control of the state, to physically eliminate or co-opt more 
moderate senior political figures who had previously supported power-sharing with the RPF, and 
to install a new government composed of Hutu hardliners. Once they had captured the state, they 
then used its considerable resources and authority to implement a genocidal program. They 
deployed its civilian and military apparatus, and mobilized ordinary Rwandans against the Tutsi 
civilian population. At the same time, government forces and the rebel RPF army also re-engaged 
in combat. The international community, instead of intervening to stop the slaughter, moved to 
evacuate foreign nationals and to draw down the 2700-strong UN peacekeeping force on the 
ground. In the end only 450 blue helmets remained. Some one hundred days later, the rebels 
emerged victorious. They had defeated the Rwandan army and militia, who escaped mainly across 
the north-west border into neighbouring Zaire. About two million Hutu civilians followed them 
into Zaire through a humanitarian corridor established by French forces in the south-west of the 
country. The international community finally responded with a new UN mission, UNAMIR II, as 
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well as massive humanitarian assistance for the refugees. However, it was too little too late for 
those trapped inside Nyamata’s church, as well as for the hundreds of thousands of other civilians 
who perished in many other places.  
 
What is Distinctive and Puzzling about Rwanda 
 
Rwanda’s genocide both shocks and intrigues at once. While mass violence is a rare 
phenomenon, the characteristics of the killing in Rwanda still stand out and capture the 
imagination for reasons worth articulating. First, the intensity of the violence and the targeting of 
women and children leave little doubt as to whether the intent was genocidal. The aim was to 
eliminate an ethnic group in entirety. If my estimate is correct, then nearly two-thirds of Rwanda’s 
Tutsi population were exterminated. Second, there is the sheer speed of the violence. These people 
were killed in little over one hundred days, and, as we shall see in chapter three, there is evidence 
to suggest the majority of the victims perished in the first two to three weeks. Third, there is the 
remarkable geographic scope of the violence. It was nationwide. There are very few places in 
Rwanda where violence did not occur. Tutsi were targeted wherever they resided or wherever they 
fled. Fourth, one of the most controversial and distinctive aspects of the violence is the scale of 
civilian participation. In practically every community where the Tutsi ‘enemy’ lived, there were 
Hutu, and also Twa, who mobilized against them. By my estimate, one in five Hutu men 
committed an act of violence during the genocide. Their targets were often people known to them 
personally. Lastly, although less distinctive, the nature of the violence is still distressing to learn. It 
was collective, crude, intimate, and cruel. Killers often wielded agricultural implements - machetes, 
forks, and hoes – as well as traditional weapons - nail-studded clubs, knives, bows and arrows, and 
spears. They confronted their victims face-to-face and overwhelmingly in groups. Sexual violence 
against women was commonplace and the infliction of gratuitous pain and suffering on victims 
features prominently in witness accounts (Human Rights Watch, 1996). 
It is these extraordinary characteristics of Rwanda’s genocide – the scale, speed, and scope 
of both the violence and the civilian mobilization – that impress themselves upon the mind and 
that have helped inscribe it as an event of enduring significance in world history. They also 
represent an empirical puzzle – distinct from the overall question of why genocide occurred - for 
which we still do not have a good explanation. How and why did so many Rwandans mobilize, so 
quickly, kill so many, and in so many places? The urge to explain these disturbing and distinctive 




What We Know Already 
 
Rwanda has become a paradigmatic case of genocide and as such it has stimulated an 
abundant literature. We know much already. Three subject areas have emerged and attracted much 
attention. First, there is the question of responsibility and accountability for the genocide. The 
forensic investigations into what western governments knew, the meticulous reports of human 
rights organizations, the many moving first-hand accounts by Rwandans and foreigners on the 
ground at the time, the various stories told by journalists, and the extensive records of the 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda may all be found here.5 The identities of the 
politicians, military figures, state employees, clergy members, businessmen, professionals, 
journalists, academics, as well as even some ordinary Rwandans, who each participated in the 
genocide, have all become public knowledge in this way. Second, there is the aftermath of the 
genocide and Rwanda’s trajectory following it. This area has generated the most writing, some of 
which has been deeply-polarized in assessments of the post-genocide regime’s record. The main 
themes here are justice and reconciliation, development and democracy, and human rights and 
civil liberties, as well as the regional repercussions of the genocide.6 Third, there is research on the 
history and causes of the genocide itself and the motivations of the individuals who participated 
in it. This book belongs to this last category. Although much has been written here also, there 
remain important gaps in our understanding and highly-contentious debates on several aspects of 
the genocide that persist.  
There have already been several excellent reviews of the considerable literature on the 
genocide’s origins, and I recommend them to readers interested in tracing the remarkable 
evolution in our knowledge and understanding.7 The consensus on what did - and what did not - 
contribute to the genocide continues to evolve. Early ideas – media reports of an uncontrollable 
                                               
5 On the international community’s responsibility, see for example Barnett (2002); Cohen (2007); Melvern (2006); 
Power (2002); Verschave (1994). On the responsibility of Rwandan actors, see for example Des Forges (1999); 
André Guichaoua (2005); A. Guichaoua (2015); T. P. Longman (2010); Rever (2018); Ruzibiza and Vidal (2005); 
Thompson (2007). The reports of human rights organizations include those by African Rights (1994); Des Forges 
(1999). First-hand accounts include, by non-Rwandans, Booh-Booh (2005); Dallaire and Beardsley (2004); Khan 
(2000); Marchal (2001), and by Rwandans, J. K. Gasana (2002); Hatzfeld (2005a, 2005b); Kabagema (2001); 
Mukagasana and May (1997); Nduwayo (2002); Rusatira (2005); Sibomana, Guilbert, and Deguine (1999). 
Journalistic accounts include Gourevitch (2004); Keane (1995). The public records database of the International 
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, now closed, can still be accessed online at http://jrad.unmict.org/. 
6 On wide-spectrum assessments of Rwanda’s trajectory after the genocide, see Campioni and Noack (2012); O. 
McDoom (2011); Straus and Waldorf (2011) On justice and reconciliation in post-genocide Rwanda, see for 
example Buckley-Zistel (2006); Burnet (2012); Philip Clark (2005); P. Clark and Kaufman (2009); Bert Ingelaere 
(2017); Thomson (2013); Waldorf (2006). On democracy and development, see for example Ansoms (2009); 
Beswick (2011); Booth and Golooba-Mutebi (2012); Gready (2010); Hayman (2009); B. Ingelaere (2010); Pottier 
(2002); Reyntjens (2004, 2013). On the genocide’s regional implications, see for example Gerard Prunier (2005); 
Reyntjens (2009); Turner (2007). 
7 Four of the most insightful reviews of the extensive literature on Rwanda’s genocide are J. P. Kimonyo (2000); 
Uvin (2001); Timothy Longman (2004); Lemarchand (2007). 
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explosion of immutable tribal passions and the suggestion of state failure – no longer have much 
scholarly support.8 Similarly, the claims that Rwandans committed violence out of a cultural 
predisposition for unthinking obedience - or out of a base desire to acquire the land of their victims 
in the face of a Malthusian resource crisis – are rarely repeated. However, I believe these 
perspectives need to be softened and refined. I find there was some ‘pressure from below’ and some 
Rwandans did participate in the genocide out of respect for the state’s symbolic authority 
legitimizing the violence.  
Nonetheless, a scholarly consensus has crystallized on several issues in explanations of the 
genocide. First, the violence was not spontaneous, but highly-organized; not a reaction of the 
masses but the strategy of a small elite (Des Forges, 1999); and not driven by emotions or passions 
but by power and politics. As mentioned, however, I believe this top-down perspective overstates 
elite agency and rationality and underestimates pressures from below. There were individuals at 
the local level, outside of the state structure and within society, who also pushed for violence. 
Second, the identities – Hutu and Tutsi and in whose names the violence was framed - were 
constructed and instrumentalized. In particular, colonial-era racial science embraced by the 
Belgians magnified and rigidified group differences and the identities became associated with 
political power (Mamdani, 2001). This equation persisted to deadly effect into post-independence 
Rwanda. Third, the perpetrators were largely ‘ordinary’ and their motives heterogeneous (Straus, 
2006). It would be difficult to argue the killers were all extraordinary or deviant in some way given 
the scale of civilian participation in Rwanda. However, I contend this implicit view of the 
perpetrators as an undifferentiated mass overlooks important intra-group differences that matter 
for understanding the mechanics of mass mobilization. Patterns in motivation were discernible. 
Fourth, the media, in particular radio broadcasts, framed and propagated messages to stoke fear, 
resentment, and hostility among the Hutu population toward the Tutsi as an ethnic group which 
in turn motivated and mobilized individuals to kill (Thompson, 2007). As we shall see, however, 
the radio’s role was also ex post justificatory. Its content radicalized and provided an ideological 
rationale for the killing only after much of the violence had been committed. Lastly, few disagree 
the genocide was the culmination of a process in which three short-to-medium term factors - 
Rwanda’s civil war, move to multiparty politics, and ongoing peace negotiations - were all 
consequential in the elite decision-making that pushed Rwanda closer to genocide. Their impact 
‘below’ – how they affected and were interpreted by ordinary Rwandans - however, is less well-
documented and the significance of these effects implicitly underestimated.  
                                               
8 For a deconstruction of the New York Times’ framing of the genocide as ‘tribal hatred’ see Chari (2010). On state 
collapse, see Zartman (1995). 
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Why Consensus on the Genocide is Limited 
 
Yet the number of issues on which there is a clear consensus is still surprisingly small given 
the remarkable amount of data and writing that research on the genocide has generated. Numerous 
theories still circulate and debates persist. Emotions and politics play a part in generating the 
diversity in explanations. Another reason, already noted, is the uneven quality of the evidence used 
to support the explanations offered (Straus, 2006, p. 3). Some scholars rely on primary evidence, 
both archival and oral, collected specifically to build or test theories. Others draw more heavily on 
secondary sources and their theoretical imagination in making their claims. A final reason for 
proliferation is methodological. The choices in respect of comparison and level of analysis matter. 
Comparisons help strengthen causal inferences by pinpointing similarities and differences between 
cases. While cross-case comparisons are often contentious given the persistent debate over how 
to define genocide, within-case comparisons – between time periods, places, and persons for 
instance - still offer an opportunity to narrow down explanations. What were Hutu-Tutsi relations 
like before and after the war started? Why did some regions experience violence early on, but 
others later? Why did some people kill and others not? There is value in leveraging the considerable 
and complex variation within the genocide. While we do have studies that make such intra-case 
comparisons, most commonly between places, rarely do the methodological rationales, when 
given, align and allow for broader theorization.  
The level at which the genocide is analysed – macro, meso, or micro - also affects the 
explanatory factors identified. The vantage-point matters. Research on perpetrators at the micro-
level has yielded fascinating insights into how and why individuals killed. Studies of events at the 
macro-level have deepened our understanding of how and why the genocide occurred. But how 
generalizable are findings at lower levels of analysis? And what are the links between individual-
level behaviours and national-level processes?  
The different levels of analysis scholars have chosen also represent a useful way to 
summarize and classify the multitude of theories generated since the genocide. Macro-level 
explanations are plentiful. The story of Rwanda’s genocide has been well-told from the ‘top’. These 
accounts focus on individuals, events, and processes at the national and international levels. Yet 
they have suggested a very diverse set of structural, conjunctural, and historical factors behind the 
genocide. Structural processes suggested include growing demographic pressure, increasing 
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ecological scarcity, an acute economic decline, and ‘structural violence’ and inequality.9 
Conjunctural events emphasized include the start of the civil war, the move to democratize, the 
failure of the peace process, the rise of hate media, the impact of a structural adjustment program, 
the assassination of the president, the role of the Church, and the indifference if not complicity of 
international actors.10 Historical factors raised include Rwanda’s history of identity-based politics, 
an exclusionary founding myth or narrative, a racist ideology, the legacy of a deeply-inscribed racial 
or ethnic cleavage, the memory of one group’s inferiority and oppression by another group, as well 
as a materially strong state.11 Scholars often weave some combination of these factors together 
into convincing narratives. Some compare Rwanda to other cases of genocide – and in two 
instances to cases where genocide could have but did not occur - to make more causally credible 
claims.12  
Micro-level explanations, by which I mean how and why individuals came to commit 
violence, have also grown in number.13 Numerous theories exist for how and why individuals 
participated: deprivation, opportunism, peer pressure and coercion, prejudice and racism, threat 
and fear, conformity and obedience, ideological commitment, displaced frustration, desensitization 
and habituation, and social ties and interaction are among the many explanations suggested.14 Some 
scholars have built sophisticated models, often drawing on psycho-social theory, to explain how 
individuals become perpetrators.15 However, we lack a strong empirical basis – a systematic 
comparison of perpetrators against non-perpetrators for instance - to confirm or falsify these 
various ideas. 
                                               
9 On demographic pressure, see for example Bonneux (1994); Ford (1995). On ecological scarcity, see for example 
André and Platteau (1998); D. Newbury (1994); Peter Uvin (1996). On economic decline and structural adjustment, 
see Chossudovsky (1996); Philip Verwimp (2003). On structural violence, see Uvin (1998). On inequality, see J. 
Gasana (2002). 
10 On the importance of the civil war, see Straus (2006, pp. 224-226). On democratization and also the rise of 
exclusionary ideology, see Mann (2005, pp. 428-448); Snyder (2000, pp. 296-304). On the failure of the peace 
process, see Jones (2001); A.J. Kuperman (1996). On the complicity of international actors, notably France, see 
Verschave (1994). On racist ideology, see Uvin (1998). On myths and narratives see Stuart J. Kaufman (2011); Straus 
(2015). 
11 On the history of identity politics, see C. Newbury (1998). On the importance of Rwanda’s racial and ethnic 
cleavage, see Mamdani (2001). On the importance of state power, see Straus (2006). 
12 Comparative analyses that include Rwanda can be found in Sémelin (2005); Chirot (2008); Kiernan (2009); Powell 
(2011); Mann (2005). Straus (2015) and Midlarsky (2005) also compare Rwanda against negative cases – where 
genocide did not happen.  
13 Uvin (2001, p. 98) first made this observation on the deficit of micro-level studies.  
14 On deprivation, frustration, prejudice, and racism, among other explanatory constructs, see Uvin (1998, pp. 107-
139). On opportunism, see Uvin (2001, pp. 98-99). On peer pressure and coercion, see Straus (2006, p. 139). On the 
role of obedience, see Gérard Prunier (1998, p. 248). On ideological commitments, see Mann (2005, pp. 469-470). 
On social ties, see Fujii (2006, pp. 149-179). On desensitization, see Scull, Mbonyingabo, and Kotb (2016). On social 
interaction, see Smeulers and Hoex (2010). 
15 See for example Adler, Loyle, Globerman, and Larson (2008); Baum (2008); Luft (2015); Staub (2003); Tanner 
(2011); Waller (2002); Williams (2017); P. G. Zimbardo (2007). 
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Meso-level explanations are less common. Yet resistance or cooperation from local 
authorities and local communities mediated the effect of genocidal directives from the centre. The 
decisions and actions of subnational actors can profoundly shape local patterns of violence as they 
often have valuable local information and intelligence as well as local power and influence on 
which the centre depends for successful implementation of the killing. They represent the link 
between centre and periphery. In Rwanda, the choices of civilian authority figures – prefects and 
burgomasters – as well as communal police officers, local opposition parties, and church leaders 
have each mattered for mobilization and violence.16 It is worth noting that while local cooperation 
with the centre typically accelerated the genocide, resistance never prevented it altogether. The 
resources available to local actors were never a match for the means at the disposal of those who 
centrally controlled the state. 
Although there are points of overlap across these levels of explanation, what is missing are 
first explicit causal connections between the macro, meso, and micro and, second, attempts at 
comparisons.17 What are the mechanisms through which the events and processes at the macro-
level affected communities and individuals at the meso and micro-levels? How, for instance, did 
war alter relations between neighbouring Hutu and Tutsi and lead members of the former to kill 
members of the latter? How did multipartyism impact the lives of ordinary Rwandans and 
contribute to their mobilization during the genocide? How exactly did the Rwandan state’s 
authority operate to mobilize citizens to help implement genocide? There is a need for explanation 
that draws on evidence across levels and synthesizes it into a causally-coherent whole. 
Furthermore, we have too few explanations that rely on comparisons between periods, places, and 
persons purposely-selected to test or build hypotheses. By examining the genocide at differing 
levels of analysis and through more systematic comparisons, we may better be able to distinguish 
between the myriad theories that circulate.  
 
The Questions that Remain 
 
The two central questions running throughout this book are: (i) what are the circumstances 
that gave rise to the genocide; and (ii) how did these affect individuals and motivate some, but not 
others, to kill? These two primary questions raise a number of smaller but important ones. Answers 
to these secondary questions may help us choose between the myriad explanations that still 
circulate. I list these questions here to highlight the gaps in our knowledge and understanding and 
                                               
16 Excellent meso-level analyses include Boersema (2009); Brehm (2017); André Guichaoua (2005); Tim Longman 
(1995); Straus (2006); Wagner (1998). 
17 Three good exceptions are the work of Fujii (2006); Longman (2010); and Straus (2006). 
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distinguish between those for which the answers we presently have are incomplete and those for 
which the answers remain contested.  
First, we have, in my view, unsatisfying explanations of the four unusual and shocking 
characteristics of Rwanda’s genocide. Why did so many people participate in the violence? Why did 
they mobilize so quickly? Why did the violence spread so rapidly? And why did it happen in so many 
places across Rwanda? The specific and distinctive form the mobilization and violence took merits 
a separate explanation from their onset more generally. As we shall see, I believe these 
extraordinary characteristics are related to a number of extraordinary features of Rwanda’s socio-
demography and geography which have not all yet been fully explicated. These unusual 
characteristics also invite questions relating to local variation across the country in their expression. 
Why did mobilization and violence occur in some places sooner than others, for instance? And 
why were more people killed in some locales than in others?  
We also have only partial answers – the evidence base is limited - to a number of other 
important questions. Why did some people kill, but others not? How different were the attitudes 
and beliefs – that is how large was the distance or gap - between the perpetrators and the non-
perpetrators? Who were the mobilizers at the local level and what were the practical mechanics of 
mass mobilization? How exactly did fundamental changes in the macro-political environment – 
the war, multipartyism, peace process, for instance – affect ordinary Rwandans below and 
contribute to their mobilization during the genocide? Was there resistance to the killing at either 
the top or bottom – contestation between pro-and anti-violence elements? If so, why did 
extremists often prevail over moderates?  
Second, a number of questions remain the subject of ongoing debate. How many people 
participated in the genocide and how many people were killed? What role did emotions, ideology, 
and ethnicity play among ordinary Rwandans and elite decision-makers? How much was the 
genocide the product of elite manipulation from above and how much popular pressures from 
below? Was the population radicalized and ready to kill before the genocide began? Were there 
differences among the killers and what more can we say about their motives? Was the genocide 
intended long in advance? Could early international intervention have prevented it?  
I do not pretend to have definitive answers that will resolve these questions or settle these 
debates once and for all. But I have drawn conclusions and made inferences, supported by 
evidence I collected, whose merits readers can evaluate for themselves. There remain also a 
number of highly-politicized questions for which I have little new evidence of my own. Who was 
responsible for shooting down the president’s plane that triggered the genocide? And how many 
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Hutu civilians were killed during and after the genocide by the Rwandan Patriotic Army? I will 
address these questions but rely primarily on interpreting existing sources to do so.  
 
Theories and Hypotheses 
 
There is no shortage of explanations then about what caused Rwanda’s genocide and why 
Rwandans killed. One of the goals of this book is to test existing theories as well as to develop 
new hypotheses in relation to both questions. In addition to the voluminous literature specific to 
Rwanda’s genocide then, I also review here theories that have emerged from empirical and 
theoretical studies of: (i) collective violence; (ii) civil wars; (iii) ethnic conflicts; and (iv) other 
genocides. All of these literatures have potential implications for Rwanda. In setting these theories 
out, I have paid close attention to the underlying causal logic behind them in order to bring related 
macro and micro explanations together into similar analytical categories. For example, ‘war’, a 
country-level variable, could be translated at the individual level as ‘fear’. The causal logic or 
mechanism linking the two factors is essentially ‘threat’ and for this reason I classify them together. 
Similarly, a cultural propensity to obey authority may well be related to a regime’s type as 
authoritarian or to a state’s strong material capacities. I group these together as well then.  
One of the main reasons for why the range of theories is so broad is the lack of consensus 
on the concept of genocide. The 1948 United Nations Convention on Genocide defines genocide 
as ‘acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious 
group’. Almost every element in the juridical definition has been the subject of intense scholarly 
debate: the victim groups protected, the perpetrating agents recognized, the modes of 
extermination permitted, and the intention required. These debates have been well-covered already 
(Straus, 2001) and I do not attempt a new general definition of genocide here. Instead, I offer a 
description of what I believe are the defining characteristics of the violence in Rwanda. The aim 
is to help evaluate the validity of the comparisons that will inevitably be made with violence 
elsewhere.  
I believe then Rwanda’s genocide may be characterized as action organized by individuals 
who control the apparatus of the state, in collaboration with members of the general population, 
that deliberately but not exclusively targets a group whom these individuals perceive as innately 
distinct, using violence whose purpose is to eliminate the targeted group physically. The 
involvement of ordinary, private citizens in both the organization and implementation of the 
violence was a shocking and defining feature of Rwanda’s violence. Popular participation in war-
time violence, on the side of the state, is not unusual. However, such participation varies in its 
scale, organization, and relationship to the state. In Rwanda, this participation was massive, 
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organized, and closely-coordinated with the state. In contrast, pro-government militias, such as 
the Janjaweed in the Sudan’s Darfur region, while also organized and aligned with the regime, 
typically involve a much smaller number of individuals. The massive scale of societal involvement 
in the physical act of killing sets Rwanda apart from many other cases. 
 
i. Wars, Insecurity, Threats and Fear-Based Explanations  
 
It is widely-recognized wars and genocides have a strong relationship (Sémelin, 2005; 
Shaw, 2015; Straus, 2015). But the questions of how and why exactly a macro-level variable such 
as war facilitates genocides have produced some quite different answers. First, it has been argued 
that wars provide a ‘cover’ for genocide (Winter, 2003). In the ‘fog of war’ it is often difficult to 
obtain reliable information on who is killing whom. Victims can sometimes be mistaken for 
aggressors, and civilians can be mistaken for combatants. In Rwanda, poor information flow meant 
that by the time the violence was recognized as genocide, tens of thousands of Tutsi and moderate 
Hutus had already been killed. Second, it is argued that wars help genocides because they can create 
political opportunities or political upheavals that challenge and weaken regimes.18 Following 
Habyarimana’s assassination, the civil war immediately re-ignited and an extremist minority seized 
the opportunity to eliminate or co-opt the moderate opposition. It then established itself as the 
new regime and unleashed its genocidal program. Third, it is argued that wars brutalize people. 
Through repeated involvement in and exposure to war-time violence, individuals become 
desensitized to its effects, and become capable of cruel violence themselves. This argument has 
been made to explain atrocities committed by ordinary American G.I.s in Vietnam (Faludi, 1999, 
pp. 291-358). It may also explain the actions of ordinary Rwandans in 1994. 
Last, and perhaps the most common explanation, however, is that wars create threats. 
Threat is a central theme in explanations of genocides that seek to identify the motivation for 
violence.19 Security dilemmas, a threat-based concept from international relations theory, can arise 
within countries as well as between them. A domestic security dilemma occurs when one group 
takes defensive action that is interpreted as offensive by the other side. In such situations ‘the drive 
for security in one group is so great that it produces near-genocidal behaviour towards 
neighbouring groups’ (Posen, 1993, p. 106). Related to this, at the individual-level, war-time threats 
create fears. Fear amplifies the need for security and the ‘target for ethnic violence will be the group 
that is the biggest threat’ (Petersen, 2002, p. 68). Threat-driven fear can be strategically framed in 
collective terms to mobilize communities (Shesterinina, 2016). In the case of Rwanda, it has been 
                                               
18 On political opportunities, see Krain (1997, p. 355). On political upheavals, see Barbara Harff (2003, p. 62) 
19 See for instance Chirot (2008); Sémelin (2005); Straus (2006). 
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argued that Hutu civilians either feared the rebel RPF would kill them, or that it would reverse the 
revolution and reinstate the Tutsi monarchy that had oppressed them historically. They killed in 
self-defence. But how widespread were these fears among ordinary Rwandans? Through what 
mechanisms did they divide communities? We lack answers to these questions.  
 
ii. Demographic and Environmental Explanations  
 
Civil wars, or violent conflict more generally, have a long history with both demography 
and ecology. At the macro-level, one of the more enduring demographic hypotheses has been the 
‘youth bulge’. Bulges arise when an unusually high proportion of a population is ‘young’, often 
defined as those in the 15-24 year-old age bracket. Cross-national research has suggested that this 
demographic particularity makes countries more vulnerable to domestic armed conflicts, 
rebellions, and even revolutions.20  The closest micro-level equivalent is the perceived threat posed 
by male youth. Described as ‘loose molecules in an unstable fluid’ (Kaplan, 1994), young men it is 
argued are particularly vulnerable to mobilization and recruitment into rebel groups, militia and 
gangs. Some argue that it is because their opportunity cost is low: unemployed young men do not 
have livelihoods or income to lose (Collier & Hoeffler, 2004, p. 569). Others argue it is about 
responsibility: young men can afford to engage in risky activity such as violence because they do 
not have families or established careers to worry about (J. Goldstone, 2002). Yet others say it has 
to do with young people’s attraction to change and ideas: they are susceptible to ideological appeals 
for action (Huntington, 2002). In the context of Rwanda, its newly-formed political parties did 
have ‘youth wings’ that competed and even fought each other before the genocide. Many of these 
young men allegedly formed the backbone of the attack groups during the genocide. The most 
infamous of these groups, the Interahamwe, were in fact more than a youth wing. They were a militia 
that had been trained to kill. The role of young men in Rwanda’s genocide is a hypothesis that 
bears investigation. 
Ecological explanations of group conflict have at their root a scarcity of natural resources 
on which the population depends. Arable land, water, and forests it is argued are most likely to 
create tensions within communities when they are in short supply (Homer-Dixon, 1999). The 
original Malthusian argument has largely fallen out of favour: war, disease, famine, or other disaster 
do not inevitably occur because the population grows faster than the food supply. They are often 
mediated, usually by human ingenuity to mitigate the underlying resource scarcity. Instead, a softer, 
neo-Malthusian claim argues that environmental scarcity simply creates conditions in which 
                                               
20 On youth bulges and armed conflicts, see Urdal (2006). On rebellions, see Moller (1968). On revolutions, see J. A. 
Goldstone (1991). 
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conflict is more likely to occur.21 Diamond (2008, p. 23), most popularly associated with the 
modern Malthusian argument, writes ‘Rwanda represents a Malthusian catastrophe happening 
under our eyes, an over-populated land that collapsed in bloodshed.’ When scarcity coincides with 
other factors such as group inequality, weak conflict-mediating institutions, and demographic 
pressure, then conflict is even more probable. The causal pathways are varied and complex. In 
explaining Rwanda’s genocide, its land and people are often cited. Rwanda’s population growth 
was high, averaging 3.3 percent per annum between 1985 and 1991. On average, 422 Rwandans 
lived in every square kilometre of its farmable land. This made it the highest density in Africa in 
1991. There has in addition been evidence to support the importance of a resource crunch at the 
micro-level and its role in the collapse of Rwandan society (André & Platteau, 1998; Ohlsson, 
1999; Marijke Verpoorten, 2012b). The importance of land scarcity then remains an important 
hypothesis to investigate in the context of Rwanda.  
 
iii. Deprivation-Related Explanations.  
 
The notion of deprivation lies at the root of a wide variety of related concepts used to 
explain conflict, violence, and also genocide. These include vertical and horizontal inequality, 
structural violence, relative deprivation, and difficult life conditions among many others.22 At the 
heart of some of these ideas is a grievance-centric mechanism. Relative deprivation for example 
occurs when there is a discrepancy between an individual’s aspirations and his/her capabilities. 
The result, it is argued, is frustrated energy that can be displaced and expressed as aggression. 
Structural violence, a broader term encompassing deprivation, prejudice, and inequality, focuses 
on a different set of emotions: despair, anger, and cynicism it argues are the antecedents of actual 
violence. Despite the sophistication of many of these concepts, it is difficult to evaluate their 
explanatory value across cases. In part this is because they are not always consistently defined and 
in part it is because they are difficult to measure. Nonetheless deprivation-related arguments seem 
to resonate more with Rwanda than in other genocides. As with the demographic and 
environmental arguments, this is likely to be because of another of Rwanda’s particularities: it was 
a poverty-stricken country in sub-Saharan Africa. Many of its perpetrators were themselves poor. 
While it is relatively easy to make macro-level generalizations from these facts, individual-level 
                                               
21 See Ishiyama and Pechenina (2012); Uvin (2001, p. 83).  
22 On vertical inequality, see for example Besancon (2005). On horizontal inequality, see Stewart (2002). On 
structural violence, see Uvin (1998). On relative deprivation, see Gurr (1970). On difficult life conditions, see Staub 
(1989, p. 44). 
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evidence to support deprivation-related claims is in shorter supply.23 Deprivation-related 
explanations deserve further investigation at the micro-level. 
 
iv. Identity/Ethnicity and Racism/Prejudice-Based Explanations  
 
Identity – both personal and social – is a powerful motivational force in individuals and 
groups. It has been studied intensively by social psychologists who have built numerous competing 
theories of inter-group relations based on it. Social identity theory for example argues that self-
esteem motivates individuals (Tajfel, 1982). Social dominance theory in contrast assumes a socio-
biological instinct for superiority: societies are inherently hierarchical and dominant and subordinate 
groups will always arise (Waller, 2002). Realistic group conflict theory is premised on individual 
rationality (Sherif, 1988). Individuals will exhibit ingroup solidarity when there is competition for 
scarce resources. 
Ethnicity - a particular type of social identity - has captured the imagination of scholars of 
wars and violence. It has special properties it is argued that makes it particularly easy to mobilize 
groups. ‘Ethnic conflict’ and ‘ethnic violence’ have now become distinct phenomena. They 
continue to command scholarly attention even though they have been shown to be quite rare when 
compared against the universe of all ethnic groups (J. Fearon & Laitin, 1996). Several other related 
concepts have identity or ethnicity at their root: ‘primordial attachment’, ‘ancient tribal hatreds’, 
and ‘inter-ethnic enmity’ implicitly emphasize the importance of ethnicity.24 The scholarly 
consensus now is that ethnic identity is both constructed and relational. Identity is not the product 
of essentialist or immutable differences between groups. Instead its salience varies over time and 
space as a consequence of both structural and strategic forces. Genocide scholars have also 
recognized identity can be instrumentalized by ethnic entrepreneurs to mobilize groups. The 
consensus among Rwanda specialists is that the meaning of Hutu and Tutsi evolved over the 
course of its history, i.e. the identities are constructed and malleable (Des Forges, 1999, pp. 31-33; 
Mamdani, 2001, pp. 73-75; C. Newbury, 1988). However, under Belgian colonial rule these 
identities were institutionalized and reified as racially distinct. At the time of the genocide, it is 
argued, ordinary Hutu assimilated messages that emphasized the distinct racial origin of the Tutsi. 
They were alien, did not belong in Rwanda, and thus deserved to be removed. However, the extent 
to which ordinary Rwandans actually believed these statements is largely unknown. The 
                                               
23 An exception is Philip Verwimp (2005) who finds those with something to gain and those with something to lose 
were more likely to be drawn into the violence.  
24 On primordial attachment, see Geertz (1975). On inter-ethnic enmity, see Straus (2006).  
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effectiveness of these intentional efforts to increase the salience of these identities needs to be 
investigated at the individual-level. 
At the micro-level, ethnic prejudice and racism are closely related to ingroup and outgroup 
identities. While positive sentiments towards one’s ingroup can be expressed as pride, loyalty, and 
superiority, negative feelings towards the outgroup subsume contempt, hostility, and prejudice 
(Brewer, 1999). A considerable amount of research has focused on this last expression: the causes 
and measures of prejudice. However, much less is known about the impact of prejudice on actual 
individual behaviour. Would prejudice motivate an individual to commit violence? What exactly is 
the relationship between prejudice and ethnic conflict? 25 It certainly seems a question that would 
also be germane to genocide. Anti-Semitism, or rather a particularly pernicious form of it, has been 
suggested as an explanation of the Holocaust (Goldhagen, 1997, pp. 392-393). Dehumanization 
of the outgroup, an extreme form of prejudice, is seen as a stage along the path to genocide. 
Rwanda’s history contains many examples of precolonial, colonial, and modern state policies that 
have discriminated against one or other ethnic groups. Racism it is argued is deeply embedded in 
Rwandan society and was activated during the genocide (Uvin, 1998, pp. 216-217). Both theory 
and evidence suggest that the role of prejudice needs to be investigated in Rwanda’s genocide. 
 
v. Ideologies, Myths, and Narratives  
 
Ideologies, myths, and narratives feature prominently in explanations of wars and 
genocides.26 Linking them is the role each plays in shaping individual and collective beliefs about 
the targeted group. A diverse set of ideas underlie the ideologies identified by scholars as conducive 
to the exclusion of a group: notions of purity and contamination; future utopias built on a racial 
identity; the idea that groups may be considered either civilized or barbarous; the belief a nation-
state was founded for a particular core ethnic group.27 Nationalism, particularly ethno-nationalist 
ideology, has a strong association with violence. It emerges in contexts of democratic transition 
and weak conflict-mediating institutions when ‘ethnos’ and ‘demos’ become readily conflated 
(Mann, 2005, p. 4) or when elites instrumentalize nationalism to rally popular support (Snyder, 
2000). As with ideologies, the content of historical myths and narratives embedded in societies 
about ‘other’ groups also ranges widely. It includes beliefs that one group has been the victim of 
injustice by the ‘other’ group; that this group cannot be trusted and represents a potential threat; 
                                               
25 For a good review of the literature on the relationship between ethnic prejudice and conflict, see Green and Seher 
(2003) 
26 See for example Barbara Harff (2003, p. 62); Stuart J Kaufman (2015); Snyder (2000, pp. 37-39); Straus (2015). 
27 See Chirot (2008); Melson (1992); Sémelin (2005) on purity; Weitz (2005) on utopias; Powell (2011) on barbarism 
and civilization; and Levene (2005) on the nation-state. 
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and that the group does not belong and originates outside of the society. These myths and 
narratives cue the emotional reactions - resentment, fear, and hostility for instance – that emerge 
in intergroup relations (Stuart J. Kaufman, 2001).  
Yet the causal role of ideology, myths, and narratives in mass violence is complex and 
contested. Ideology proponents point to the power of ideas to unify and mobilize a group, and to 
motivate members to take action (Leader Maynard, 2014). Ideology also justifies this action – 
including violence - taken against another group (Costalli & Ruggeri, 2015). Others argue 
ideologies, such as the founding narrative of the state (Straus, 2015), shape the decisions of ruling 
elite to include or exclude particular groups (Chirot, 2008). Perpetrators are ‘killers by conviction’.28 
In contrast, others have argued that ideological commitments do not really motivate individuals. 
They merely provide a rationale, often ex post, for otherwise self-interested behaviour (Mildt, 1996, 
p. 311). For rationalist proponents of ethnic conflict, myths and narratives are merely cultural raw 
material that political entrepreneurs use to magnify fears and mobilize populations (Lake & 
Rothchild, 1998, p. 20). They are simply ‘amplifiers’. For culturalist advocates, however, these 
myths are in fact one of the necessary conditions for violence (Stuart J. Kaufman, 2001, p. 30; M. 
H. Ross, 2007). Ethnic conflict is not possible without them.  
Group myths were certainly presently in Rwanda. The narrative, common among Hutu, 
was that Tutsi had arrived in Rwanda as pastoralists after the Hutu. They were strangers in a new 
land that they colonized. They also pressed into servitude the Hutu settlers, and ruled over them 
until the revolution toppled the Tutsi monarchy. It has been argued that many of Rwanda’s Hutu 
leaders and population feared that the RPF, comprised principally of Tutsi, would reinstate this 
pre-revolutionary order. Similarly, it has been argued Rwanda had a racist ideology emphasizing 
past Tutsi oppression and distinct racial origins deeply-embedded in its society (Uvin, 1998, pp. 
34-39). It was reawakened through extremist media such as the newspaper Kangura and the radio 
station, Radio-Télévision Libre des Mille Collines, and used to mobilize the civilian population. Appeals 
to Hutu nationalism were at the core of the ‘Hutu Power’ movement it is argued. The movement 
brought extremists from Rwanda’s different political parties under one ideological umbrella. 
However, the extent to which such an ideology had been internalized by ordinary Rwandans is 
largely unknown. Those who claim Rwandans were ideologically radicalized at the time of the 
presidential plane crash have mainly assumed that what is disseminated from above will be believed 
below. But how much credibility did ordinary Rwandans give to the radio? Or to the politicians 
who preached ethnic division? These questions need to be more carefully examined in the 
Rwandan context.  
                                               
28 Mann (2005, p. 239) for example has argued this about Nazi perpetrators. 
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vi. Political and Material Opportunism  
 
This set of explanations argues that actors take advantage of opportunities and violence is 
the outcome of action pursued in their self-interest. The benefits to themselves can be diverse. 
Political opportunists seek power by exploiting gaps in the political structure. At the macro-level, 
democratic transitions for instance can create instability and several explanations have focused on 
the potential for violence in such moments. Competitive politics create incentives for both ruling 
and ‘challenger’ elites to mobilize constituents, sometimes along ethno-nationalist lines.29 Violence 
becomes politics by other means. Rwanda’s move to multipartyism in 1991 is widely-recognized 
as a critical juncture in its trajectory toward genocide but how exactly did party politics push the 
country closer to ethnic confrontation? Was there a conflation of ‘ethnos’ and ‘demos’ (Mann, 
2005) in which democracy was equated with Hutu majority rule? Political opportunities may also 
arise from other types of structural transitions. Wars, revolutions, and other political upheavals 
can create the necessary break in the opportunity structure for extremists to seize control of the 
state (Barbara Harff, 2003; Krain, 1997). Democratization is only one example of political 
opportunity creation. 
At a more micro-level, opportunity-centred explanations claim individuals commit 
violence because it can be a form of upward social mobility. Perpetrators of the Holocaust took 
advantage of the opportunity to further their careers by showing their willingness to do their 
‘jobs’.30 Others argue that the opportunity for self-enrichment is an important motivation. 
Rwandan génocidaires frequently looted the property of their victims. Rape and sexual violence were 
also prominent features of the genocide and there is evidence that the land of victims was 
redistributed in some places. How important were the spoils of the genocide and in what ways did 
they work to motivate individuals in Rwanda?  
 
vii. Group Behaviour and Collective Action  
 
This collection of theories is based on the observation that individuals behave differently 
in groups to when they are alone. One field of research has been crowd psychology.31 What turns 
peaceable crowds into violent mobs? De-individuation – the sense that you are not personally 
responsible for your actions – is central to these arguments (L. Festinger, Pepitone, & Newcomb, 
                                               
29 On the risks posed by democratization in Rwanda, see J.-P. Kimonyo (2016); Roessler (2005); Silva-Leander 
(2008); Snyder (2000). 
30 See for example Mildt (1996). 
31 See for example Canetti (2000); Le Bon (1896); Tambiah (1996). 
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1952). Other research has instead focused on riots (D. L. Horowitz, 2002), that is to say episodic, 
seemingly spontaneous outbursts of group violence, or else pogroms (Brass, 1996), which imply 
greater organization and often the acquiescence of the state. Do these follow predictable patterns? 
Yet other work argues against a general theory of collective violence and instead highlights 
multiple, different mechanisms at work (Tilly, 2003). A different and promising avenue of inquiry 
for Rwanda has been the exploration of the effects of conformity and peer pressure on individual 
behaviour. As Milgram’s (1964) experiments famously suggested, these forces can even cause 
individuals to inflict harm on others. Others point to coercion or ingroup policing], that is the 
threat or use of physical penalties, to mobilize a group (Brubaker & Laitin, 1998, p. 433; 
Pfaffenberger, 1994). In Rwanda, the violence was collective. Rwandans assembled into attack 
groups to hunt for and kill their targets. What importance should be attached to this fact? Were 
individuals mostly coerced into the violence or did they participate willingly? Are the forces that 
initiated individuals to violence different from those that sustained them? These questions bear 
further investigation in Rwanda.  
 
viii. The State, Elite, and Obedience-Related Explanations  
 
At the country-level of analysis, the connection between the state and genocide is a very 
strong one. But what aspect of the state is important in explaining genocide? One debate centres 
on the type of regime in control of the state. Authoritarian regimes it is argued are more likely to 
commit genocide than democracies (R J Rummel, 1995). Institutionalist and normative logics have 
been proposed as explanations. If power is highly concentrated in a single or few institutions - as 
in dictatorships – checks and balances are weak and it becomes difficult to organize opposition to 
state-enforced policies such as genocide. The normative logic points to the respect of human rights 
and values such as tolerance and pluralism that prevail in democracies as a source of restraint. 
Another set of arguments focus on the state’s material capacity instead. Strong states, particularly 
those with modern bureaucratic, military, and financial systems, have the means to organize and 
implement mass violence and have nurtured the argument that genocide is a by-product of 
modernity (Bauman, 2000). Rwanda has been described as an atypical state in sub-Saharan Africa 
(Straus, 2006, p. 202). Its machinery of state was visible and effective outside of urban centres. 
How did this fact affect the violence? A third set of arguments relate to the state’s authority. The 
state can lend its symbolic authority to legitimize its actions. It enjoys the Weberian monopoly on 
the legitimate use of violence in the enforcement of its order. It is the authority of the state that 
distinguishes criminal from justified use of force. 
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At the individual-level, the state authority-oriented argument neatly dovetails with 
obedience-centred explanations. In countries where the state’s authority is strong, it is tempting to 
infer a ‘culture of obedience’. This argument has been put forward to explain participation in 
Rwanda’s genocide and in the Holocaust.32 Ordinary Rwandans killed because the authorities told 
them to do so. In reality it is difficult to know if the absence of overt civil disobedience indicates 
a reverence for authority or instead a recognition of the state’s capacity to punish dissent: 
obedience or compliance? Alternatively, perhaps we assume obedience because we do not ‘see’ 
dissent even though it is present. Resistance can be covert and subtle. The ‘weapons of the weak’ 
are rarely public and confrontational (Scott, 1985). But did Rwandans robotically obey orders to 
kill or was their action the result of a strategic calculation of what was in their self-interest to do? 
The importance of individual agency is more common in explanations that focus on the 
role of elites. The image of the obedient masses also neatly dovetails with the image of a 
manipulative leadership. The malleability of ordinary citizens is matched by the ability of elites to 
exploit and mobilize them. This instrumentalist paradigm is popular in accounts of Rwanda. It was 
a small group of individuals in positions of power and influence who organized and are thus 
responsible for the genocide in Rwanda. Many of them occupied positions of authority within the 
state apparatus. The notion that genocide is the product of elite calculation and logic has 
considerable support among scholars wedded to rationalist explanations of conflict. Ruling elites 
choose genocide to attain strategic military and political objectives (Figueiredo & Weingast, 1999; 
B. A. Valentino, 2004) or because it the most ‘convenient’ solution to a problematic population 
(Chirot, 2008). However, the emphasis on both the state and elites in these arguments tends to 
eclipse the extent – if any - to which pressure for the violence originated from below – from within 
Rwandan society itself. In a challenge to such top-down explanations, it has been argued that mass 
violence usually also has social roots and popular involvement is commonplace. Social groups of 
varying agenda either coalesce or compete to redistribute power within society (Gerlach, 2006). 
The role of ordinary individuals in initiating and sustaining the violence – pressure from below - 
needs more careful scrutiny in the context of Rwanda.  
 
ix. Dispositional and Situational Explanations  
 
According to the dispositional perspective, individuals commit extraordinary crimes 
because they possess extraordinary characteristics that predispose them to violence. The list of 
traits that distinguish such individuals is long and the root causes complex: perpetrators might be 
                                               
32 For obedience in Rwanda, see Gérard Prunier (1998, p. 248). For the Holocaust, see Staub (1989, pp. 108-111) 
 33 
especially authoritarian, anti-social, sadistic, or narcissistic for example.33 However, these 
explanations do not resonate as strongly in cases of mass violence. Could so many Rwandans for 
example have had ‘abnormal’ personalities? If we did accept there was something extraordinary 
about so many Rwandans, the argument almost approaches a culturalist explanation. It suggests 
there was something peculiar about Rwandan culture that made so many Rwandans susceptible to 
genocidal violence. These types of arguments are difficult to prove, especially without comparison 
to another culture. The hostility to the claim that only Germans could have eliminated the Jews in 
the Holocaust because of a particular German cultural predisposition reflects the dangers of such 
an argument.34  
‘Deviancy’ type explanations then give way to ‘ordinary men’ arguments in the context of 
mass participation. Ordinary individuals become capable of atrocity only in extraordinary 
situations. The now-famous psycho-social experiments of Milgram (1963) on authority, Asch 
(1951) on conformity, and Zimbardo (1973) on situational roles and perceived power underpin a 
scholarly consensus in favour of situationalist explanations of atrocity commission. This early work 
has led to sophisticated models of how individuals become capable of evil (Waller, 2002). There 
is a ‘Lucifer effect’ (P. G. Zimbardo, 2007). Yet more recent research has begun to challenge the 
methods and conclusions of the first-generation work on the willingness of ordinary individuals 
to inflict harm on others. Scholars have begun to argue individual motivations are heterogenous 
(Hinton, 2004; Straus, 2006) and that that there are important distinctions between participants, 
bystanders, and rescuers that require explanation (Baum, 2008). But what evidence do we have of 
the distribution of the different motivations within society? Do these motives change over time? 
If so, what causes them to change? 
 
x. Bystander, Inaction, and Impunity Effects  
 
At the individual-level ‘bystanders’ can exert a very powerful influence over perpetrators. 
Their inaction can legitimize the actions of perpetrators it has been argued (Staub, 1989, pp. 86-
88). This is most apparent in group situations. Passivity is seen as acquiescence and it contributes 
to group ‘norming’. Those who pursue violence – even if they are in a minority - feel they enjoy 
the support of the majority that looks on. Their faith in their chosen course of action is affirmed. 
Bystanders might well be unaware of the effect of their silence and the power of their dissent. 
What were the many Rwandans who did not participate in the genocide thinking and feeling at the 
                                               
33 On authoritarian personalities and perpetrators, see Suedfeld and Schaller in Newman and Erber (2002). On anti-
social personalities, see Staub (1989, pp. 70-73). On sadism and narcissism, see Baumeister and Campbell (1999). 
34 Goldhagen (1997) had advanced this culturalist argument. 
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time? Did they approve? Were they indifferent? Or did they object but were afraid to voice their 
objections? The role of the non-participants in the violence deserves a closer look in Rwanda’s 
genocide. This micro-level mechanism has an equivalent at the meso and macro-levels. The 
Catholic Church, the civil society actor best-placed to counterbalance the power of the state in 
Rwanda, was at best equivocal in its condemnation of anti-Tutsi violence before and during the 
genocide (T. P. Longman, 2010). Similarly, it has been argued that the absence of protest or 
opposition from other governments emboldened the extremist government. The absence of 
external constraint meant it felt it could act with impunity. According to this view, the failure of 
the international community to recognize a genocide in Rwanda, to condemn the actions of the 
extremists, and to intervene were encouragements to them. The moderates found themselves 
without outside support to strengthen their position (Des Forges, 1999, p. 2). 
 
xi. External and International Factors 
 
In contrast with the many theories that focus on the domestic determinants of genocide, 
these explanations highlight forces that operate beyond the confines of state boundaries. Midlarsky 
(2005) argues genocide is the product of realpolitik between states and stresses state insecurity 
created by territorial loss. The RPF, which invaded Rwanda with Ugandan support, eventually 
made territorial gains that threatened the state controlled by a Hutu elite. More broadly, the role 
of foreign sponsorship is often highlighted in cases of internal war where an external sponsor 
provides diplomatic and material support which, if given to challengers, alters the balance-of-
power and intensifies the threat to incumbents. The Habyarimana regime clearly felt it had been 
attacked by Museveni’s Uganda (J. K. Gasana, 2002). A similar logic is used to explain the role of 
diasporas. Their support, often financial, provides the means for challengers to initiate and sustain 
rebellions (Collier & Hoeffler, 2004). The RPF owed its capability to wage a war to the efforts to 
mobilize the Rwandan refugee population by its predecessor organization, the Rwandese Alliance 
for National Unity. Insofar as war and genocide are causally related, external actors such as states 
and diasporas may have contributory roles.  
A second set of arguments points to the extra-territorial impact of domestic politics in 
neighbouring states. Bhavnani and Lavery (2011) argue transnational ethnic ties mean threats to 
ethnic kin abroad may affect perceptions of threats at home. The assassination of Burundi’s first 
elected Hutu president by Tutsi soldiers profoundly impacted the trust in Rwanda towards the 
RPF. Similarly, the unwelcoming politics facing Banyarwanda communities in Uganda and Zaire 
shaped the decision to seek armed return to Rwanda (Mamdani, 2001, pp. 159-185). Lastly, as 
mentioned in relation to bystanders, international inaction – the failure to condemn and stop 
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atrocities – may embolden extremists to continue coercion. However, it has also been argued that 
international action can even increase the risk of genocide. Mediators facilitating the Arusha 
negotiations underestimated the extent to which Hutu hardliners were willing to go to protect their 
position and pushed too hard for an agreement hardliners within the government could not accept 
(A.J. Kuperman, 1996). 
  
The Argument Sketched 
 
To answer the two central questions posed in the book - how and why the genocide 
occurred and how and why ordinary Rwandans came to participate in the ensuing violence – I 
consider the many theories in circulation against the evidence I collected and present an argument 
that first identifies the conditions that increased the risk of genocidal violence in Rwanda and then 
traces the steps in the causal process that ultimately culminated in it. My ontological approach to 
causal explanation then explicitly recognizes that phenomena such as genocide are the product of 
complex sequences of events and of strategic interactions between actors that unfold over time.  
My argument begins then by recognizing several socio-demographic and historical 
peculiarities that set this otherwise little-known country apart from others in Africa. These unusual 
features did not mean genocide was inevitable in Rwanda. But they did portend that societal 
division and political contestation would be more likely to occur along ethnic rather than non-
ethnic lines in this tiny African state.   
To start, Rwanda’s ethnic structure was distinctive. It comprised only three groups, unusual 
in a continent with the world’s highest levels of ethnic diversity, of which one, the Hutu, 
constituted an overwhelming numerical majority. No state on the continent had an ethnic 
imbalance as large as that in Rwanda. The asymmetry would lend credence to the claim that Tutsi 
minority rule was particularly unjust. The relationship between these three groups was also 
distinctive. They were not tribes or even clearly ‘ethnic’ groups in the popular or conventional 
sense. They did not inhabit separate regions, they did not possess distinct cultures, and they did not 
have different political systems. Hutu, Tutsi, and Twa had instead been ruled together as one 
people, the Banyarwanda, since the late precolonial era. Moreover, their relationship was ranked. 
Tutsi came to signify higher and Hutu lower status. Mobility had once been possible within the 
social hierarchy. Despite all these particularities, Belgian colonial policy unfortunately failed to 
recognize the unusual structure, nature, and relationship between Rwanda’s ‘ethnic’ groups. It 
instead reified the differences and reinforced the ranking between them by favouring Tutsi in the 
allocation of state offices and by recording ethnicity on compulsory registration cards. The 
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institutionalization of ethnicity and of its ranked structure would represent a structural vulnerability 
for Rwanda.  
 Rwanda also experienced an idiosyncratic trajectory to independence. Its social revolution, 
which abolished the Tutsi monarchy and ushered in an independent Hutu-controlled republic, 
was, along with the Afro-Shirazi revolution in Zanzibar, an exceptional event in the history of 
African decolonization. It was also a critical juncture in Rwanda’s political history. By reversing 
the Tutsi political monopoly Belgium had established and creating instead a Hutu ethnocracy, it 
challenged the ethnic ranking of Tutsi ascendance and Hutu subordination. It also gave rise to an 
ideology which framed the revolution as the moment of Hutu emancipation and equated 
democracy with Hutu majority rule. The revolution powerfully reinforced the Hutu-Tutsi 
boundary. It also triggered an exodus of several hundred thousand Tutsi out of Rwanda. The 
refugees would always look to return. In short, Rwanda represented a highly unusual baseline. A 
distinctive ethnic demography, a history of institutionalized ethnic favouritism, and a revolutionary 
shift in an ethnically-ranked order were among the features that distinguished this small central 
African country. These unusual characteristics magnified the risk that political contestation would 
follow ethnic rather than non-ethnic boundaries in Rwanda.  
This risk was realized in 1994 by the conjunction, against this unusual baseline, of two 
macro-political events: a civil war and political liberalization. Their coincidence was historical 
accident. The rebel invasion happened to occur with the democratic wave that swept across Africa 
following the end of the Cold War. Their origins, however, were causally distinct. Together they 
constituted an acute threat: an external military threat and an internal political threat. They induced 
both mass and elite insecurity. At the outset, however, the war radicalized some, but not many 
ordinary Rwandans. In contrast, among the ruling elite, the dual threat instilled an acute sense of 
vulnerability. It portended the redistribution or complete loss of political power.  
Liberalization represented not only a threat to the incumbent political class. It presented 
also an opportunity for their challengers. Its most immediate impact was to pluralize Rwanda’s 
political landscape. Importantly, moderate, not extremist ideologies dominated initially. The 
political competition created by liberalization divided the country primarily along partisan, not 
ethnic lines. In fact, several of the new opposition parties enjoyed cross-ethnic support at the 
outset. However, as the war progressed, this changed. It was not simply that the war radicalized 
Rwanda’s politics. Liberalization also drove the war. The two processes interacted. Most fatefully, 
liberalization resulted in a serious design flaw in the peace process. It produced a multi-party 
coalition government before the conclusion of a peace agreement and power-sharing settlement. 
The opposition parties participated in the negotiations as part of the Rwandan government 
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delegation. Yet their interests were more aligned with the rebels than with the ruling party. The 
terms ultimately agreed then conceded too much military and political advantage to the enemy in 
the view of regime hardliners. The result was the escalation of elite contestation and the rise of 
ethnic extremism. 
This contestation was complex. It took place both between and within actors. The 
contestation created by the war was between the rebel RPF, composed primarily of Tutsi exiles 
who attacked from Uganda, and the Government of Rwanda, dominated in the initial phase of the 
war by a northern Hutu elite. This military contestation interacted with and escalated the political 
contestation created by liberalization. Initially, this political contestation was between 
conservatives and reformers. Within the ruling party, it took place between loyalists and reformers: 
individuals committed and opposed to the president. It also took place between the ruling party 
and the main opposition parties: individuals who sought to preserve or to change the distribution 
of political power. However, as the war escalated, the contestation between conservatives and 
reformers evolved into contestation between moderates and hardliners: individuals open or 
opposed to using force to avoid power-sharing across ethnic lines. Each escalatory action 
committed by the rebels bolstered the credibility of hawks and undermined the influence of doves 
within the ruling and opposition parties. In turn, escalatory actions committed by hardliners in 
these parties strengthened the determination of the RPF to resolve the external contestation on 
the battlefield. In short, the contestation created by the war and the contestation created by 
liberalization strategically interacted and drove each other in a mutually-reinforcing cycle.  
Escalation and extremism, however, were not inevitable in Rwanda. I argue it was the 
weakness of domestic and international constraints on the actions taken by each side that enabled 
the threat to intensify and ethnic extremism to rise. At the domestic level, key state institutions 
and civil society actors failed to respond to extremist rhetoric and violence. Extremists acted with 
impunity. At the international level, the absence of an intervention force capable of enforcing 
peace preserved the military threat, and external pressure for democratic reform and to participate 
in power-sharing talks reinforced the political threat. As these dual threats escalated, so too did 
the inter-elite contestation.  
This contestation intensified in the space of opportunity created by Habyarimana’s death. 
His assassination, which was of by far the longest-serving head of state in sub-Saharan Africa to 
be killed in office, created an unprecedented political opportunity. In theoretical terms, it marked 
a sudden rupture in the political opportunity structure. No other country in sub-Saharan Africa 
had experienced this ‘perfect storm’ of a civil war, political liberalization, and assassination of head 
of state. They represented the coincidence of a security threat with a political opportunity. In the 
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power vacuum and uncertainty that ensued, hardliners within the regime manoeuvred for control 
of the state. Regime moderates responded and were initially successful in rebuffing extremist 
efforts to seize power. Simultaneously, the civil war resumed as the Presidential Guard engaged 
the RPF in Kigali, and extremist violence commenced, targeting Tutsi civilians and Hutu political 
moderates. Both the rebels, whose high command was not divided in how to respond to 
Habyarimana’s death, and the regime’s extremists refused to de-escalate.  
Yet, I argue, genocide was still not the inevitable outcome of this intensified contestation. 
The regime’s extremists were not destined to prevail over moderates and to capture the state. The 
power struggle could have resolved in either side’s favour. Contestation escalated in favour of 
violence and extremists, however, because the domestic and international constraints on escalatory 
actions were, again, weak in Rwanda. At the domestic level, Rwanda’s state institutions not only 
failed to stop the extremist violence targeting civilians, they failed to mediate the conflict over the 
president’s succession and the continuation of government. Extremists argued the 1991 
constitution while moderates claimed the 1993 Arusha peace agreement governed the succession. 
In contrast, it was clear that there was no legal basis to install a new cabinet. Nonetheless, Rwanda’s 
Constitutional Court, the legally-mandated institution, was not called upon to resolve either issue. 
It was viewed as partisan, not independent. Its president, who would be among the first to be 
assassinated on April 7th 1994, had publicly declared his support for an opposition party. At the 
international level, the erroneous characterization of the violence as only a civil war rather than 
also as a genocide, and belated attribution of responsibility to the extremists, along with the 
decision not to reinforce but to draw down the UN peacekeeping force, played out in favour of 
those committed to war and violence on both sides. International inaction emboldened extremists 
and reinforced their sense of impunity.  
In the face of weak domestic and international constraints, I argue the contestation simply 
resolved according to the relative material capabilities of the parties. At the domestic level, inside 
the regime, there was no clear advantage in terms of relative coordination power. Extremists and 
moderates both controlled important positions in the civilian and military apparatus of state. 
Extremists, however, had a clearer advantage in terms of coercive power. They had at their command 
superior military forces in Kigali. This enabled them ultimately to prevail at the national level and 
to capture the civilian and military apparatus of state. They installed their candidate for president, 
their candidates for an interim government, and, eventually, their candidate for army chief-of-staff. 
At the international level, as we now know, between the government and rebels, the RPF ultimately 
proved to be stronger on the battlefield.  
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The political opportunity created by the president’s assassination also triggered 
contestation at the local level. Capture of the state locally was crucial for the mobilization of the 
population and the implementation of the killing. Importantly, these power struggles did not follow 
extremist capture of the centre. They happened concurrently with the contestation at the national 
level. Across Rwanda’s eleven prefectures and 145 communes, some prefects and burgomasters, 
in particular party loyalists who subscribed to the hardliner position on the war or who had strong 
personal or kinship ties to hardliners at the centre, took the initiative themselves to use their official 
power to immediately target their Tutsi populations. In some of these localities, the violence began 
even before the fall of the centre. Violence then did not simply radiate from centre-to-periphery or 
from top-to-bottom. It moved in both directions. 
Other state officials at the local level, particularly those who belonged to opposition parties 
or who were otherwise not part of the informal network of personal ties linking the centre and 
periphery, were uncertain what to do or else refused to target Tutsi. However, once extremists 
captured the centre, officials able to face down local challenges initially were quickly neutralized. 
The centre had considerably more powerful resources at its disposal to co-opt, coerce, or cast out 
the recalcitrant. It is why extremism ultimately prevailed everywhere in Rwanda once the centre 
fell. In addition to pressures from the centre, some local officials also faced challengers – both 
extremists and opportunists - from within their own communities who sought to replace them. 
These ethnic and political entrepreneurs were not all tied to the state. Some were private citizens. 
There was resistance then to violence from within the state apparatus and also pressure for violence 
from outside of it.  
These differences in extremist control at the local level resulted in variation in how quickly 
violence broke out across Rwanda’s communes. Violence was delayed where it took time for local 
power struggles to resolve. However, it was not only elite resistance from above that mattered. 
Resistance from below in communities with strong interethnic ties also slowed down the 
genocide’s onset. In some localities Hutu and Tutsi residents collaborated to prevent violence from 
entering their communities. It took time to break these social bonds and to divide cohesive 
communities. This resistance never prevented violence altogether. It merely delayed it. 
Communities that resisted found themselves subject to extra-local pressures. Individuals and 
groups from neighbouring communes infiltrated and helped divide and mobilize those 
communities that wavered. Contagion effects were strong in a small, densely-populated country.  
Extremists, once in control of the state at either the national or local levels, used the state’s 
considerable power to implement the genocide. This power did not comprise simply the Rwandan 
state’s unusually strong material capabilities to coerce its citizens and to coordinate across its 
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agents. Its power also derived from its unusually high symbolic authority for a postcolonial African 
state. This authority legitimized, for some Rwandans, the directives of state officials and, 
consequently, also the violence when framed as national defence. The Rwandan state’s low 
autonomy vis-à-vis society was also important. Low autonomy enabled the capture of the state by 
private social and political forces. The ruling party had penetrated the state down to the lowest 
administrative level in Rwanda. Its machinery, even more so than that of the state apparatus, was 
remarkable. Party extremists instrumentalized the state which became a weapon of mass 
destruction par excellence vis-à-vis society. Together, these three distinct dimensions of the state’s 
power – its capacity, legitimacy, and autonomy – were each consequential for the genocide and 
each would matter for mobilizing Rwandans.  
Popular mobilization followed state capture. In communities across Rwanda local political 
and ethnic entrepreneurs – opportunists and racists – emerged and drew on their social networks 
to establish small groups of supporters to mobilize the wider population. Importantly, these 
mobilizing agents were not all state office-holders. They were also not all local elites. Many were 
unconnected to the state and a large number were also ordinary farmers. Pressure for violence 
existed below within Rwandan society too. Once these ‘critical masses’ had been formed, they jump-
started the violence through ingroup policing. Residents were threatened with and suffered social, 
financial, and physical sanctions if they did not join the attack groups. Not everyone participated 
in the killing. A majority in fact did not. This was, in part, due to differences in individual 
disposition toward the violence. Contrary to the consensus, killers were not all ‘ordinary’. They 
were also not all ‘coerced’ into killing. There was heterogeneity among perpetrators and a 
multiplicity of motivations. Mobilization was in fact a continuum. I found ‘extremists’ – often 
minorities in their communities – moved first, followed by ‘opportunists’, and lastly ‘conformists’, 
typically the largest group. There were also pacifists who resisted participation.  
Dispositional differences alone, however, do not explain why some participated and others 
not. Selection into the violence was also mediated by micro-situational opportunities and relational 
ties. Settlement patterns and social networks were consequential. Where you lived and who you 
knew also mattered for whether you would join in the killing. Counter-intuitively, it was not social 
isolates but rather the most socially-connected individuals in communities who were the ones most 
likely to be drawn into the violence. Social capital had a dark side. Once engaged in violence, 
individual motivations also changed. Radicalization occurred through the act of killing. Well-
known psycho-social mechanisms – desensitization, habituation, and dehumanization – explain 
how the reluctant could become the zealous. It is also how the coerced could become the cruel. 
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The shocking pain and suffering inflicted gratuitously on some victims, including the sexual torture 
of women, was also the product of repeated killing and continuing impunity.  
Such macabre behaviour is in fact not unusual in cases of ethnic violence and mass killings. 
However, the violence and mobilization that occurred in Rwanda were unusual in another way. 
They were extraordinary in their scale, speed, and scope. One in five Hutu men participated in 
killing nearly two-thirds of Rwanda’s Tutsi population in just over 100 days and in almost every 
community across Rwanda. The reasons for this, I argue, may be traced to Rwanda’s highly unusual 
socio-demography and geography. Rwanda comprised a small territory with a highly agrarian 
society, an exceptionally high population density, and an unusual pattern of spatially-integrated 
ethnic settlement. This meant the distances between communities were small, magnifying 
contagion effects; the social ties among individuals were dense and multiplex, amplifying the social 
forces of coercion and co-optation; and anonymity and privacy were low, making it difficult for 
neighbours to escape detection.  
In sum, I argue security (civil war and democratization), opportunity (democratization and 
assassination), and authority (the state) – the three themes of the book’s title - each mattered. To 
borrow a popular idiom from criminal law, they represent the means (a powerful and privatized 
state), the motive (a war-time and liberalization threat), and the opportunity (multipartyism and 
the president’s assassination) for genocide. 
 
Research Design: The Evidence and Methods  
 
Genocide is an empirically complex phenomenon. No single study can account for all 
aspects of its violence. It is also a highly politicized and deeply emotional subject. On certain issues, 
the findings may always be disputed and some people may never be persuaded. Researchers may 
find they themselves, rather than their research, are the object of scrutiny and criticism. 
Accusations of revisionism, minimalism, and denialism are among the risks genocide scholars, 
including those working on Rwanda, face. Given this, I take the time to explain, in more detail 
than is customary, the methodological choices made and the evidentiary base relied on in this book 
to help readers decide how much credibility my findings merit. Transparency will not protect 
researchers from personal criticisms intended to discredit their character and motivation. 
However, it may help demonstrate whether their conclusions have a scientifically-defensible basis 
or not.  
 
i. The Research Design 
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I made a number of deliberate choices in the book’s approach to explaining the genocide 
and individual participation in it. First, I emphasize mechanisms. The particular structural 
vulnerabilities and exceptional conjunction of events that gave rise to genocide in Rwanda are 
unlikely to exist or arise in exactly the same manner in other places. However, I believe some of 
the underlying mechanisms at work are observable elsewhere. Persistent definitional debates over 
what constitutes genocide makes grand theorization on genocide and direct comparisons difficult. 
The mechanisms-focused approach allows more contingent comparisons to be made to other 
cases.  
Second, as already noted, I examine the genocide at several levels of analysis. I synthesize 
processes and events at the macro, meso, and micro-levels in an attempt to identify the forces at 
work across them and to understand how agenda and actions at the international, national, and 
local levels interacted. Third, the approach is explicitly interdisciplinary. I draw on theoretical 
insights primarily from political science on the nature of the state and state-society relations, civil 
wars and counter-insurgencies, political communication and framing, and democratic transitions; 
but also from sociology on social movement mobilization, social networks and recruitment, and 
collective action and critical masses; and lastly social psychology looking at, inter alia, obedience 
and conformity, intergroup contact and relations, and social identity theories.  
Third, the approach relies heavily on comparisons. While this is a study of one genocide 
in one country, it makes a number of cross-national and sub-national comparisons. It points to 
Rwanda’s exceptionalism by ranking it against other sub-Saharan countries on a range of 
dimensions relating primarily to its demography and geography. It also compares how the genocide 
unfolded at multiple levels of Rwanda’s territorial administration. Rwanda comprised eleven 
prefectures, 145 communes, 1545 sectors, and about 9000 cells in 1994. The book makes 
structured comparisons between two prefectures, Ruhengeri and Butare, to capture a historically 
and politically important North-South divide in the country; two communes, Mukingo and Taba, 
chosen because the genocide began early and late in them respectively; and four cells, selected 
because two (Tamba and Mutovu) experienced high levels and two (Ruginga and Mwendo) low 
levels of violence during the genocide. The book also systematically compares individuals who 
mobilized during the genocide against those who did not. Most studies of perpetrators – primarily 
from the Holocaust and Rwanda – neglect to study those who did not commit violence. Yet 
studying non-perpetrators is important for understanding how ‘ordinary’ the killers really were and 
for helping to explain why some persons participated but others not. Lastly, it makes an inter-
temporal comparison looking at life before and during the genocide in order to trace the evolution 
of events that led up to the genocide in these communities. An important question that still needs 
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to be answered is to what extent the violence marked an unexpected rupture in inter-ethnic 
relations. Were communities widely-radicalized before the violence began? 
 
ii. The Evidence 
 
The project collected a diverse set of data types to test its hypotheses. Ultimately the argument 
presented in this book was constructed from thirteen main sources of information. First, I 
conducted a survey of 294 Rwandans. The survey questionnaire comprised 223 questions relating 
to their attitudes, opinions, memories, and beliefs.35 It also collected information on their 
demographic and socio-economic characteristics. The sample was stratified two ways. It was 
divided between perpetrators (104 individuals) and non-perpetrators (190 individuals). This latter 
group included a small number of genocide survivors (thirty-four individuals).36 A perpetrator was 
defined as any individual who joined an attack group that killed at least one individual. The 
perpetrator then need not have struck a physical blow himself.37 It was also stratified by region, 
Ruhengeri prefecture in the north, and Butare prefecture in the south. The sample was designed 
to be statistically representative of each region.  
Second, I talked to forty-two Rwandans in more detailed, open-ended interviews about life 
before and during the genocide in their communities. Twenty-one I interviewed in depth and on 
several occasions using a semi-structured interview questionnaire, and twenty-one, who were a 
subset of the 294 survey respondents, I interviewed in less detail, asking more targeted questions. 
All forty-two were individuals resident in the four chosen cells at the time of the genocide. Where 
possible, in each community I talked with survivors, perpetrators, bystanders, figures of state and 
social authority, and older residents with historical knowledge of the community. The goal was to 
interview a cross-section of these communities.  
Third, I asked literate Rwandan prison inmates – who had been accused of genocide-related 
crimes - to write histories of the genocide in their communities from their own perspectives. The 
goal was not to obtain a reliable record of events – which would have been highly unlikely - but 
to gain an insight into how and what these individuals were thinking beyond what they might 
choose to reveal in an oral interview. 
                                               
35 160 of these questions were pre-coded. The remaining sixty-three were open-ended. 
36 In Rwanda the term ‘survivor’ refers not only to Tutsi but also to the Hutu wives of Tutsi men who were 
sometimes also targeted. From among the thirty-four ‘survivors’, twenty-one were Tutsi, and thirteen were Hutu 
women formerly married to Tutsi men. 
37 It became apparent that in attack groups that encountered small numbers of Tutsi, only a few individuals were 
required to carry out the actual act of killing.   
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Turning to the quantitative data presented in the book, I relied on several datasets drawing 
either on data I had collected myself or on information in other existing datasets. First, I assembled 
data profiling Rwanda’s 145 administrative communes to test hypotheses on why violence began 
early in some places, but later in others. I drew on several sources but relied primarily on Rwanda’s 
1991 population census - the last time information on ethnicity was collected in Rwanda. Its 
credibility on this issue has been questioned, but the raw micro-data, which had until recently been 
missing, have re-appeared and allow the census to be more deeply-probed for reliability.  
Second, I undertook a census of the population of one administrative sector – about 3400 
individuals - as it existed in 1994, collected data on the spatial location of all 647 households, and 
mapped the social networks of 116 residents to help explain differential selection into the violence. 
Third, I analysed the content of broadcasts from Radio Télévision Libre des Mille Collines (RTLM) - 
infamously known as Radio Machete - from before and during the genocide. I obtained transcripts 
for fifty-five of the 360 days that RTLM was on the air. The broadcasts provide a fascinating 
insight into the evolution of extremist thinking over time, and into the issues to which radio 
listeners were exposed during this period.  
Fourth, I compiled demographic data on 160 individuals identified in a survey as organizers 
and leaders during the genocide in two prefectures to construct profiles of local mobilizing agents. 
Fifth, I collected data on the assassinations of African heads of state and on the contexts in which 
they were killed to situate the significance of Habyarimana’s assassination. Lastly, I drew directly 
from several datasets compiled by others to compare Rwanda with other countries. As I argue, 
Rwanda was an exceptional country in Africa – an extraordinary baseline for genocide - and these 
data provide the support for this claim. Too numerous to list here, I acknowledge them in the text 
when I draw on them. 
In terms of other sources of information, I also drew on data from gacaca, a traditional 
institution adapted by the Rwandan government to establish truth, justice, and reconciliation in 
local communities in the aftermath of the genocide. It was conceived primarily to expedite the 
processing of the large number of suspected perpetrators by assigning local communities this 
responsibility. While reliance on gacaca data requires caution for a number of reasons, the gacaca 
produced enormous amounts of important information concerning the genocide at the local level. 
In particular, communities collectively compiled lists of the accused, categorized by the type of 
crime they had committed, as well as lists of the victims. I also relied on evidence from the 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda in Arusha, Tanzania. Its public records database 
contains a wealth of information concerning individuals and events during the genocide. Witness 
testimony is weighed and evaluated against a high standard of proof before a ‘fact’ is established. 
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Lastly, I also drew extensively on several archival sources. I am particularly indebted to those 
researchers who compiled databases of: (i) Rwandan presidential speeches from 1962-94, whose 
content I analysed for the evolution in ideological messaging in Rwanda; (ii) declassified UN 
Security Council documents, including cables from UNAMIR to the UN Secretariat, for the period 
leading up to and during the genocide, which informed my analysis of what was known and what 
more could have been done to minimize the killing; and (iii) the minutes of closed meetings held 
and public statements issued by Rwanda’s Military Crisis Committee (MCC) and then its Interim 
Government (IG) during the genocide. These documents were invaluable for my analysis of how 
extremists outmanoeuvred moderates to capture the state and implement the genocide. 
 
iii. A Critical Note on the Methods Used in the Project 
 
As with the evidence, the level of transparency in the methods and approach followed 
should be high enough to allow readers to evaluate their suitability given the deeply-contested 
nature of research on the genocide. Methodological choices often involve trade-offs and taking 
the time to explain the risks, and the steps taken to mitigate these risks, is particularly valuable in 
such contexts.  
First, the time at which the research was conducted mattered. The evidence I draw on in 
this book was collected over the course of three main field trips: first between November 2002 
and August 2003; second in summer 2009; and lastly in spring 2017. I was asking Rwandans 
questions about events that took place first nine years, then fifteen years, and eventually twenty-
three years previously. There was a very strong likelihood that individuals would have constructed 
narratives of events subsequently, as well of course as the possibility of memory loss.  
Second, also related to the timing of the research, the social and political climate in Rwanda 
almost certainly influenced some individuals’ responses. Rwanda’s post-genocide government was 
composed heavily of the rebel group that had won the war ending the genocide. It was widely-
seen as pro-Tutsi and authoritarian within Hutu circles. Moreover, its policy of national 
reconciliation made discussion of ethnicity taboo. I anticipated self-censorship or else socially and 
politically favourable answers on certain issues.  
Third, working with perpetrators of violence presented particular problems. In the 
Rwandan context it was already a challenge to identify a perpetrator reliably. Many individuals had 
not confessed to their crimes, even though some had been in prison for nearly fifteen years when 
I spoke with them. Some were still at large in their communities. Those who had confessed had 
an incentive to minimize their personal responsibility, especially as the gacaca local courts were in 
effect when I interviewed them. There were clearly risks in relying on perpetrator testimony. 
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Moreover, there is evidently an ethical dimension to working with perpetrators of violence. One 
of the greatest risks lies in re-traumatizing individuals when asking them to remember horrific 
events. It needed to be done with care and sensitivity.  
Fourth, there was the risk of using intermediaries when conducting interviews. Unless my 
interviewees spoke French, I had to rely on the aid of a Kinyarwandaphone interpreter. His identity 
might well influence responses. In addition, there is bound to have been some loss of the linguistic 
and cultural nuances in translation. Similarly, all the respondents who were surveyed outside of the 
prison (190 individuals) were interviewed by enumerators I had hired and trained. Their identity 
might also have shaped responses.  
I tried to devise solutions to all of these challenges. None was a panacea. I attempted then 
to mitigate self-serving bias and self-censorship, which were at the heart of the first three problems 
mentioned above, through three techniques. First, I used triangulation. I verified ‘facts’ by 
comparing Tutsi survivor testimony against Hutu perpetrator and non-perpetrator statements. As 
will be evident in the following chapters, I always report answers from both groups. Second, I gave 
more credibility to ‘statements-against-interest’. A Hutu who told me that he holds the current 
government responsible for the genocide was likely to be sincere in his belief. He faced a strong 
disincentive to make this view public. Third, I sometimes asked the same question but made a 
grammatical switch from the second to third person. Instead of asking an individual ‘What did you 
do?’ or ‘What did you think?’, I would ask ‘What did others do?’ or ‘What did others think?’ While 
far from foolproof, each of these techniques went some way to helping me establish with some 
more reliability what happened in Rwanda.  
Gacaca made differentiating between perpetrators and non-perpetrators somewhat easier. 
Each community participating in gacaca was required to compile a list of the accused, and ultimately 
to categorize individuals by the crimes they had committed in their communities. However, the 
lists were not infallible. It was not unknown for false accusations to be made. To minimize this 
risk, I verified the names against a second list of the accused established by a lesser-known and 
informal gacaca process involving self-confessed perpetrators within the prison system. Only if a 
name appeared on both lists was it included for selection in the perpetrator stratum of the survey. 
Conversely, non-perpetrators were identified by checking that his/her name did not appear on 
either list. 
Intermediary effects were unavoidable given my limited Kinyarwanda. Moreover, my 
research assistant, Moses, was Tutsi. It quickly became apparent it was not possible to keep this 
fact from interviewees. However, to my surprise, when in the prisons talking to Hutu perpetrators, 
his ethnicity proved to be less of an obstacle to trust than I initially feared. To be clear, trust was 
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not immediate and it was not universal. However, after my first few interviews word quickly 
circulated within the prison that there was a ‘mazungu’ (‘white’ foreigner) doing research who 
wanted to understand the genocide from their perspective. We spent several weeks in each prison 
we visited and at the end of our time in one of them, I was surprised when Moses brought a gift 
of a portable radio to some of the inmates. The ethnic distance I had worried about was not 
reflected in the relationship my interpreter had established with the prisoners. In the case of the 
non-perpetrator survey outside of the prison, I hired enumerators who were Hutu and who were 
already known in the communities in which they operated. I found this prior acquaintance with 
the community made a big difference. People naturally found it difficult to trust outsiders. Many 
of those I ultimately chose were the local primary school teacher trainers. They were well educated 
and understood the sensitivity of the research, and they were well-respected in the communities. I 
also verified that they themselves had not been implicated in the genocide. 
Lastly, I do not have a simple answer to the ethical dilemma posed by interviewing 
perpetrators and survivors of genocide. It is a difficult balance to strike between the desire to 
understand and explain the genocide, and the welfare and privacy of the individuals affected by it. 
In the chapters that follow, while the names of places are real, the names of most of my 
respondents have been altered to protect their privacy. However, I did keep the true names of 
respondents who held public office in Rwanda, as well as the true names of well-known 
perpetrators. Many of my respondents talked willingly and openly. Others spoke without remorse, 
and even without emotion. Nonetheless, there were still a few who had difficulty. Informed 
consent procedures, though used here, did not prevent two individuals with whom I spoke from 
becoming visibly distraught as they told me their stories. I ended these interviews quickly, and did 
not re-visit these people. Ultimately, tact, sensitivity, and a respect for the limits of the person are 
the best advice I can give to others contemplating similar research. 
 
Organization of the Book 
 
Chapter two contextualizes Rwanda for the reader and sets the baseline for the genocide. 
It shows Rwanda was a highly unusual country in sub-Saharan Africa by highlighting a set of 
societal, demographic, and geographic characteristics that set it apart from others on the continent. 
It explains how – in ways that are sometimes surprising - Rwanda’s exceptional population density, 
spatial settlement pattern, limited urbanization/highly agrarian society, low ecological variability, 
small territory, cultural homogeneity, ranked ethnic structure, and numerical ethnic imbalance 
would each amplify the forces that led to the genocide. The extraordinary scale, speed and scope 
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of the violence and mobilization in Rwanda can also be traced to these extraordinary baseline 
characteristics.  
Chapter three then turns to the first of the three conjunctural factors: Rwanda’s civil war 
or ‘security’. The chapter focuses its lens on the psycho-social impact of the war on ordinary 
Rwandans and identifies the mechanisms linking the security threat to civilian radicalization. The 
chapter makes clear, however, a war-time security threat alone does not explain the genocide. The 
opportunity for extremism to emerge from the periphery was also needed and this is the subject 
of chapters four and five. Chapter four examines the opportunity created by Rwanda’s political 
liberalization, the second conjunctural factor. It analyses the impact of multipartyism at the 
national and local levels and shows it initially had an ethnically integrative effect as new parties 
built cross-ethnic support bases. However, it also shows how liberalization and the war interacted 
to gradually radicalize Rwandan politics. The internal contestation between moderates and 
hardliners that evolved within Rwanda drove the external contestation between the government 
and the RPF. It was through these strategic interactions within and between actors that the war 
escalated and extremism gained ground. 
Chapter five considers the impact of the third and final conjunctural factor: the 
assassination of Rwanda’s president – another ‘opportunity’. It examines how the unexpected 
death of Habyarimana created a power vacuum and triggered intense power struggles between 
moderates and hardliners for control of the state at both the national and local levels. These 
struggles resolved in favour of extremists because external constraints were weak and because 
extremists controlled superior coercive forces that allowed them to capture the centre. Chapter six 
then examines the role of Rwanda’s state or ‘authority’. The state was the means through which 
the genocide was implemented. The chapter traces the historical origins of the Rwandan state’s 
strong capabilities, low autonomy, and high legitimacy and explains how each of the three 
dimensions mattered for the state’s power over its citizens. Chapter seven then turns to the 
question of why and how ordinary Rwandans came to kill. It focuses on the puzzle of why certain 
individuals were drawn into the violence but others not. It shows differential selection into the 
violence was a function of dispositional, situational, and relational factors. The chapter also 
explains the micro-mechanics of Rwanda’s massive civilian mobilization. Finally, chapter eight 
concludes with a stocktaking. It considers what has been cumulatively learned about Rwanda’s 
genocide over the last twenty-five years and explores the implications of the book’s findings for 
theories of genocide more generally. 
